UN Declaration of Human Rights
Article 29 (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of their personality is possible (2) In the exercise of their rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare of a democratic [and ecological] society (my brackets)
It is a forgone conclusion to this essay that there is dire need for an environmental ethic. The extent to which we human beings are capable of changing the earth is only just being realised. We are daily assailed by increasing evidence that global warming, deforestation, salinity, pollution and species loss are widespread. The scale at which these events are occurring is unlike what has ever occurred in the past as a result of natural processes. We cannot deny that these changes are anthropogenic. Because we have this capacity to make the world unliveable for ourselves and other beings, it is imperative that we change the way we use the Earth and the nonhuman beings that inhabit it. To do this we need also to conceive of the earth as more than just a resource for human beings, we need to change the way we think about the planet.
When I began to research for this paper I soon found myself drowning in a sea of complex political and philosophical theory. The more I read, the more confused I became! I felt a bit like I had fallen down Val Plumwood’s ‘Well of Discourse’, endlessly arguing to and fro and around theory, all the while sideways glancing “in dismay into the fearful and bottomless Abyss of Relativism”.
I attempted numerous strategies to try to find some commonality, some thread to lead me through the minefield of theory: I compiled lists, tables, mindmaps, even resorted to comparing indexes in a desperate hope of happening across some one sentence that might pull it all together. It was at that point, surrounded by reams of paper wasted to the end of such knowledge, that I had a kind of personal epiphany. If the theories I read were incoherent in the context of my own life, how could I expect that they would inspire others to change theirs? No matter how watertight the arguments, mere reason will not move anyone to action without feeling. The kind of feeling you might get from looking at that graph.
I have had occasion in the past to dwell on the philosophical framework of my life and realised that theory plays little part in our initial impetus to take up a cause, to devote ourselves to social change. It begins with a psychological state, of doubt and dissatisfaction that leads to a desire to change things. Theory often comes afterwards, and perhaps it is the role of academics and philosophers to articulate the premises of social change movements, but they do not start them.
There is no doubt that a lot of environmental activists are angry and despondent when they think about the current ecological crisis. These feelings come of frustration that our society does not regard nature with much esteem, and felt powerlessness in the face of a so-called democracy that seems much less fair than it could be. From whence does this sense of fairness stem? Why be fair? Why care about others, human or nonhuman, being treated fairly?
I guess some of the answers may be found in biology. Indeed socio-biologists seek to explain all human cultural phenomena in terms of survival of the species – and indeed a concern for the welfare of future generations of human beings fits this mould. This is a kind of “extended self-interest’’, entirely human-centred (or anthropocentric) in conception, that some self-styled ‘pragmatic’ environmental ethicists suggest is all we need to ensure ecological preservation. We know that if we continue our excessive resource abuse of the environment we will jeopardise the survival of future human beings. Not only will they suffer material deprivation, but also be psychologically diminished as we leave them a less biodiverse and less beautiful world than the one we were born into. Yet when we despoil wilderness, alter the global climate, manipulate and engineer nature to suit our purposes, we are doing more than merely decreasing our own chances of survival. As conscious, reasoning beings are we not capable of recognising the natural world as more than a resource for ourselves?
It was Scottish philosopher David Hume who observed that ethics begins with “esteem, respect, regard, kinship, affection and sympathy” (in Callicott 1989:198) In advocating social change in favour of environmental protection we are taking a moral position that requires respect for the biotic community as well as the human one. So I returned to the central premises of Deep Ecologists, Ecofeminists, and Ecoanarchists, as the foundation for my environmental ethic. These three theories all provide some aspect of the analysis of what is wrong with the system that has led to ecological destruction and the social injustice that accompanies it. With these theories in mind I will try to articulate what I think is a viable strategy for social change that will benefit the environment and promote social justice.
Roger Gottleib in The Ecological Community suggests that “the realisation that our manner of life leads so easily to the elimination of other species and a kind of slow suicide (for our species) should make us deeply suspicious of the beliefs our culture has held”. For this reason I consider the social change fundamental to achieving environmental outcomes to be primarily an ideological one.
But it is not enough to stop there. For as Edward Abbey says in the infamous novel that inspired the Earth First! movement, The Monkeywrench Gang, “Sentiment without action is the ruin of the soul” or as I am fond of saying ‘philosophy is no substitute for action’! For it is only through positive action that we may mitigate the ecological crisis which is also a crisis of what it means to be human.
Deep Ecology – what it is, what it is not
I feel obliged to dispel some of the misconceptions that have been circulated by opponents of deep ecology, or more succinctly ecocentrism. The primary tenet of ecocentrism is that the human species are an integral part of nature, not somehow above or better than nonhuman life, and that this has moral implications regarding our behaviour. This ‘biospherical egalitarianism’ then requires that all other entities that fit the criteria of moral considerability be included in deliberations over our use of the environment.
Perhaps the earliest conservationist to warrant the ecocentrist label is Aldo Leopold, famous for having written of his ‘Land Ethic’ in 1949. For Leopold the “integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community” was paramount. His approach, rating biotic integrity above individuals has had a pervasive influence on environmental policy in that quite often individuals and sometimes whole species are eradicated in the interests of preserving conservation values of other species or a protected area as a whole. However, such eradications are usually done for anthropocentric reasons.
Leopold’s approach is what is called ‘ethical holism’, in that it rates the community’s benefit over that of the individual. In my opinion this is not necessary nor moral, and it has led to charges of misanthropy against ecocentrists in general. As Ecofeminist Marti Kheel says, “what the wholists seem to forget…is that the whole consists of individual beings - beings with emotions, feelings and inclinations - and these too are part of the whole.” (1985:22)
This is the stream of ecocentrism which has gotten the most criticism is that relying on what Robyn Eckersley calls ‘autopoietic value theory’. Autopoietism posits that because organisms or entities are self-renewing, they have intrinsic value and hence are morally considerable and should be allowed to fulfil their life-potential. This substantially widens the scope of who or what is morally considerable to the point many consider ridiculous – that, and that sometimes “killing of a wildflower…is just as much a wrong…as the killing of a human…in some situations it is a greater wrong” (Taylor in Nash 1989:155) However, Taylor does differentiate between wanton destruction and self-defence. Indeed, the radical exclamations of ecocentric wholists do nothing to promote the widespread acceptability of their ethic when they make statements about “siding with the bears” (John Muir in Nash), that injuries resulting from trees spikes “served them (the loggers) right for killing trees” (Gilliam in Manes 19:458). Biospheric holism takes no account of the rights of individuals except insofar as they are endangered. J Baird Callicott makes it absolutely clear in his earlier writings that he himself considers abstract entities like ‘species’ to have a “prima facie claim to preferential consideration” because diversity contributes to ‘stability’ (Callicott 1980: 325). He goes as far as to suggest that individuals in a biotic community are like the cells in a body – they have no importance except as parts of a functioning whole. The practical use of this analogy is questionable. The interests of a human or other organismic body can be defined in terms of interests. Individuals have goals, to reproduce themselves and to survive until this is accomplished, that ecosystems clearly do not.
Other ecocentrists consider a fundamental metaphysical shift in the way we perceive ourselves as humans and as individual ‘selves’ is supported by new findings in the physical sciences that suggest that matter is more space than solid, and as such there is no clear line between our self and the environment we find ourselves in. In a parallel with what ecoanarchists say about individualism being impossible and parasitic on community, so to our physical entity is seen to be more part of the physical community than was previously thought (see Table I).
It is this latter notion of the insuperability of individuals and wholes that I take to be a useful one in formulating a socio-environmental ethic.
Table I
CORE TENETS OF THE THEORIES
| CONCEPT OF SELF | HUMAN PLACE IN THE WORLD | ORIGIN OF ECOLOGICAL CRISIS | ||
| Ecocentrism | extended self | No discrete entities, self-realisation and flourishing of nature interrelated | Hierarchy of humans over nature (anthropocentrism) | |
| Ecofeminism | extended family | No autonomy: self -realisation through caring relationships with others (which can include nature) | Hierarchy of men over women. Male values over so called feminine ones (dualism) | |
| Ecoanarchism | extended self | Autonomy/community dynamic: Self realisation through social relationships | Hierarchy of human over human, duplicated in human domination over nature |
Murray Bookchins main criticism of deep ecology in particular is that is relies too much on ‘intuition’ or ‘mysticism’ and is anti-rational. I contend, along with most Ecofeminist thinkers, that considering intuition as a valid source of knowledge is not the same as rejecting rationality, rather it is supplement to it. All so called factual and scientific claims about the world are ultimately based on concepts that are taken as given – concepts broadly identified by Kant as being apriori and only known through intuition: time, space, causality, infinity, even the process of logic is unprovable and must simply be accepted. By this Kant defines the limits of human reason.
Instead of appealing only to abstract universal or scientifically verifiable principles and by implication rejecting intuition, ecocentrists accept that when we think of environmental problems we FEEL something is wrong. These feelings are the starting point for change:
The emphasis of both philosophies [Ecocentrism and Ecofeminism] is not on abstract or ‘rational’ calculation of value but rather on the development of a new consciousness for all of life…they call for an inward transformation in order to attain outward change..(Kheel 1990:128) [my brackets]
Ecocentrist philosopher John Rodman attempts to describe not only his emotional and moral outrage at environmental destruction, but also the intuition all life has value and the myriad forms of oppression are interconnected in this quote:
I confess that I need only stand in the midst of a clear-cut forest, a strip-mined hillside, a defoliated jungle, or a dammed canyon to feel uneasy with the assumption that could yield the conclusion that no human action can make a difference to the welfare of anything but sentient animals … I strongly suspect that the same basic principles are manifested in quite different forms…in damming a wild river and repressing an animal instinct, in clear cutting a forest and bombing a city, in Dachau and a university research laboratory, in censoring an idea, liquidating a religion or racial group, and exterminating a species of flora or fauna… (John Rodman 1988: 192)
Ecocentrists accept not only the evidence of ecological science that everything is interconnected at an ecological level, but extrapolate psychological and socio-cultural interconnections. As such, band-aid or end-of-pipe solutions to social or ecological problems are not enough.
Ecocentrism Redefined
It is the main concern of Ecocentrists, to change the way people perceive nonhuman nature and their place in the world. We consider nonhuman life to have value of and for itself – intrinsic value – and though, in my opinion, value may only be attributed by human beings who, as far as we know, are the only animals capable of reasoning, it does not exclude our appreciating the environment and everything in it as being valuable in ways other than ones that directly relate to the needs of human beings. Queensland’s own Nature Conservation Act (1992) mentions intrinsic value as one of the motivations for the act. In study done by the TWS in 1996, oft quoted by me, only 12% of respondents thought economic growth was more important than wilderness preservation. The study found that “there was strong and widespread agreement…(that) ‘wilderness areas should be preserved for their own sake, not because people want to use them’” (1999: 2)
Arne Naess redefined ecocentrism in his formulation of the Deep Ecology ethic in 1973. Naess allows scope for the rights of individuals in the “vital needs” clause: recognising that all life forms require the use of others for their survival, but that this should be minimal. Naess’ ethic has an important facet regarding personal growth and integrity which is often overlooked or outright rejected as mystical nonsense in interpretations. An important part of Naess philosophy is the idea of ’self-realisation’. Naess bases this in the traditions of “non-violence, non-injury and reverence for life” in Buddhism and other eastern religious traditions. In this sense, it goes beyond being a value-theory, and instead suggests that respect for nature is as much a psychological attitude, an ecological consciousness. Warwick Fox furthers this notion of self-realisation in his ‘transpersonal ecology’. Murray Bookchin, despite being a most vehement critic of Deep Ecology himself advocates consciousness change as a means to achieving ecological sustainability. In the same way that Fox suggests a reconfiguring of the meaning of self to include the biotic community (and even the cosmos), Bookchin advocates a reconfiguring of what it means to be an individual in the context of the wider community good, and Ecofeminists in the interpersonal.
Both Naess and Fox and some Ecofeminist thinkers ground their of Abraham Maslow’s model of personal growth and fulfilment, and Lawrence Kolhberg’s model of moral development. Maslow predicates the higher levels of self-realisation and ability to identify with the whole on self esteem and safety. So too Kohlberg’s stages 5, 6 and 7 which recognise the importance of community, the sacredness of life and ultimately identification with the cosmos is predicated on the same things. The ‘cosmic unity’ that Kohlberg and Fox talk about is in part a recognition of our place in evolution.
Both systems, though not without their flaws, rely on a conception of human virtue that can only be supported by material and psychological safety. And from this I turn to the importance of good interpersonal relationships and social justice as integral to sustainability. A reassessment of our relationship with nature, our concepts of self and what it means to live a good life are all keys to the ecocentric approach to environmental justice.
A Useful Ecofeminist Critique
I have mentioned some of the criticisms Ecofeminists have with Ecocentrism. Yet on many things they do agree. Feminists identify ‘androcentrism’ as the root of social inequity and Ecofeminists ‘androcentric anthropocentrism’ as the root of ecological inequity.
In a capitalist society individuals become rich only at the expense of others, and those others are predominantly women, though as we shall see with Ecoanarchism, the whole human community may suffer also. Women do most of the unpaid work in the world, including growing most of the food. When food production becomes industrialised men take over, but in the scheme of things, day-to-day subsistence food production is primarily done by women.
The individualist liberalism that is basic to a free market system is parasitic on women’s work. Cleaning, meal preparation, child rearing and care are predominantly done by women. This unpaid work provides the social support necessary for paid workers to devote themselves more fully to their ‘careers’. In a system where the economic is the highest value, only paid work is considered ‘real’ work. Everywhere men own most of the property and in some cultures also their wives and children. As such, women are often only valued in their ability to provide heirs and workers, the real work they do to sustain the family unit is undervalued. Some Ecofeminists identify this ‘sustaining’ role as a vital one to sustaining the earth: and this is perhaps borne out to some extent by the predominance of women in volunteer helping organisations, in particular green groups and animal rights groups.
Analysing the position of women in relation to nature Vandana Shiva links the use and abuse of nature with the violation and marginalisation of women, especially in the ‘majority’ world. Both stem from the primacy of economic development, a process she argues is more aptly ‘maledevelopment’. Social institutions like science, technology, politics, and the economy itself, are inherently exploitative: thus every area of mainstream human activity marginalizes and burdens both women and nature. There is only one strategy, Vandana Shiva suggests, to survival and liberation for nature, women and men: the ecological path of ‘harmony, sustainability and diversity’.
Shiva claims that women, in India in particular, have been both saviours and victims of maldevelopment. Many women find solidarity in identifying with the oppression and destruction of nature. Indeed, it is vital for them to do so, when it is of great importance to them to ensure the survival of their families. The personal impetus to protect nature felt by many women overlaps with the self-realisation aspect of Ecocentrist theory.
A study of women’s roles and influence on society in the Indian region of Uttar Pradesh in India found that,
Woman’s role in the conservative society in Garhwal, is determined more by men, tradition and livelihood patterns. As in the other patriarchal societies, these influences have restricted her role - largely to home, hearth, child rearing and those farming activities which have a basis in gender rather then equity;
Her contribution to family is enormous and is recognised well - both within home and outside. Her contribution to community development is the deep ethical grounding which she bestows on her children; Beyond this has been the realm of men, until recently; Last, few decades have seen the formation of many formal women’s savings and self help groups, crèches run by women in the villages and women undertaking a variety of welfare or development activities in their communities. (Srivastava 1997)
Another facet of anti-environmental ideology is suggested by a gendered approach to morality. Psychologist Carol Gilligan suggests that it is often a psychological disposition of men (perhaps as a result of traditional gender roles) to subordinate relationships to universal principles or rules and thus relationships are devalued or objectified (Gilligan 1987:19) The effect of objectification is intellectual separation of subjectivity and objectivity, personal and public, feeling and ‘fact’: dualism! As such it is may be easier for many men to suppress their feelings of wrong doing towards women or the environment to a higher so called moral principle that advocates the primacy of individual actions (including those done for profit) over relational and community spirited ones. Yet both caring, and objective rational calculation are socialised into us and may be undone. In this the project of personal change advocated by Ecocentrists intersects with that of many Ecofeminists.
The Anarchist dilemma
Anarchism identifies oppression with hierarchy. Where one individual or institution has power over people, those people are liable to feel resentful, be uncooperative, or fearful. Ecoanarchists are convinced that by simply removing the hierachies that constitute the public sphere, individuals will be empowered enough to take life-affirming control of the way the world is used. Anarchism reifies a dialectic between the individual and the community in a way that affirms the value of both. An anarchist society, like that posited by Bookchin and his ilk supposes that individuals, given the freedom to make well-informed and valid decision that affect their lives will choose those options that are also communally beneficial. The obvious flaw in this schema is that there is no reason why they should choose communally beneficial options over self-serving ones, much less ecologically sound ones. That the latter is so is evidenced by the only long-running anarchist experiment in the Mondragon co-operatives in Spain.
This is a criticism ecofeminsts make of ecoanarchism – in that it denies the difference and importance of personal ties in influencing our decisions. It is also a critique Ecocentrist make of social ecology in that something more than an economic or human-centred valuing of the environment (for in an anarchist community the environment would surely continue to be valued economically as a resource) As such something approaching an ecological consciousness that combines a scientific and biological knowledge with a spiritual or personal appreciation of the nonhuman world is essential to an ecologically sustainable community.
Connections
I contend that despite the fact that Ecocentrism, Ecofeminism and Ecoanarchism define their premises as quite differently, they have important similarities also.
All three base their world view on a conception of what it means to be a human being that extends beyond of a narrowly defined autonomous self. Indeed, the idea that we can be autonomous is considered a myth, and all three recognise the autonomous liberalist idea of self to be supported by unacknowledged others: the biosphere, the work of women and the support structures of the volunteer or gift economy as constituted in the social network of community. All three see the realisation of the good of the individual as essential to and dependant on community. All three identify hierarchies of some kind to be the cause of social and ecological oppression (see table I)
The fact that social movements are recognising the unity of their oppressions is the driving force behind the anti corporate-globalisation movement such as that exhibited at the huge protests at Seattle, Washington, Melbourne, Prague, Quebec and the recent world-wide M1 protests. Such unity serves an important purpose in bringing together disparate groups, enhancing their understanding of one another and giving them more ideological force by recognising their similarities. This has been misunderstood or misconstrued by the mass media as being too disjointed to be effective and indeed even naïve.
This is the politics of difference Ecofeminists talk about, in action. Indeed, in accepting that others can be different and not wrong allows for a truly inclusive and participatory public sphere to develop. As we accept there are a plurality of ways to deal with environmental and social issues, in a local context, we must also realise that the only way to do this is through providing optimal conditions: of “mutual respect, openness, (and) scrutiny of (our) relationships with one another” which Dryzek postulates is the only way to create ‘truly public opinion, and crucially, the conditions for confrontation with state power.”
These conditions are, of course, already a characteristic of many social change groups.
Strategies for Change
Paul Taylor, an Ecocentrist, defines his ‘Respect for Nature’ ethic as tripartite,
consisting of :
1. A belief system - that all nature is interconnected and interdependent; all parts are necessary to the whole; that all parts are inherently worthwhile 2. An ultimate moral attitude - respect for the autonomy of oneself and other persons as loci of inherent worth, hence respect for nature
And
3. A set of rules defining our duties - non-violence, a commitment to minimal harm etc
As it is my opinion that the political project of environmentalism is essentially driven by a moral schema such as this, I would suggest that to Taylor’s 3 points we add a fourth
4. A strategy for realising those values
Ecocentrist and Ecofeminist thinkers have only suggested what form a grreen society should take. They have only provided a few guidelines as to how things need to change. But it is my conviction that the evidence for such change is manifest in many non governmental agencies, and even in some of the more progressive strategies of government itself.
Insofar as Ecoanarchism, Ecocentrism and Ecofeminism identify hierarchies of some kind as the root of oppression, a politics of change for the better would have to exhibit the dissolution of hierarchy. This is fundamental to a system that aims to be fair: As all are born ‘free and equal’ so shall they be treated.
Jim Dodge’s article on Bioregionalism describes the practice of social change as being equal parts resistance and renewal. There is considerable overlap in what constitutes resistance or renewal, for example involvement in alternative food co-ops serves both purposes (see Table II)
Table II
Strategies for Change
| RESISTANCE: | activism | RENEWAL: | articulating alternatives | ||
| COLLECTIVE | PERSONAL | COLLECTIVE | PERSONAL | ||
| Involvement in local politics, com consultations etc | Changing personal consumption habits: boycotts etc | Formulation of theories for structural change | Consciousness change through education, self development | ||
| Using all available means in democratic process (as we know it) | Trend towards self-sufficiency where possible | create and get involved in local co-operatives, NGOs: alternative economy | Nurture self and others through participating in various struggles and seeking to understand | ||
| Advocate non-hierarchical decision making | Intellectual vigilance against sexism, racism, etc | alternative media to provide a voice for the voiceless | importance of learning the skills of questioning early in life | ||
| involvement in protest movements: saying “NO to violations of widely held human values” | living and building cities that encourage community rather than alienation | ||||
| non-violent direct action and civil disobedience | changing public policy to facilitate community action |
This table is by by no means exhausts the possibilities.
In trying to formulate strategies for change, I have largely stayed away from mainstream democratic processes. It is contrary to non-hierarchical decision making for proponents to get involved in politics through elections when democracy as practised in Western societies is a travesty of the ideal. Janet Biehl, a social ecologist, describes western democracy thus:
To label this system politics is a gross misnomer. It should more properly be called statecraft. Professionalised, manipulative, and immoral, these systems of elites and masses impersonate democracy…Far from empowering people as citizens, statecraft presupposes the abdication of citizen power… (Biehl 1997:1)
The abdication of power to another is tantamount to permitting them to dominate over you, and the extreme extension of this is violence. Participation as a politician in such a system is to accept compromise. Certainly, so long as economic values outrun any other, ecology will continue to be compromised.
“Why think that non-official people could not arrange life for themselves…?” (Tolstoy)
Insofar as I advocate self-determination of social and political organisation, I think it would be contrary to prescribe any one way to go about it. However, there are any examples of self-determined communities who, acknowledged or not, operate under what might be called anarchist principles of non-hierarchical decision making, provide opportunities for women’s equal participation and nurture both each other and the environment.
The fact that people can arrange their own lives is in evidence everywhere: from P&C meetings to, green groups, to intentional communities, to struggles for self-government. People everywhere resent being told how to live by governments that are distant both physically and ideologically from their day to day lives.
There a myriad examples of people ‘arraigning their own lives’ that I might refer to. Uttarakhand, in the north of India, is well known for its various active social movements. It is the birthplace of the Chipko movement of non-violent resistance, possibly the Third World’s best known and studied environmental struggle (‘chipko’ literally means embrace – hence tree-huggers) The Chipko Movement was the result of hundreds of locally autonomous groups. The main participants and organisers have been village women, acting to save their livelihood and their communities.
Uttarakhandi activists have also sought to combat the precipitous declines in the economic, social, and ecological integrity of the Himalayas with a host of campaigns that have met with varying levels of success.
Uttarakhand is a very poor and environmentally damaged region, yet the people have organised to solve their own problems where the government has either ignored them or been actively hostile. Protests for self government in 1994 resulted in the murder of unarmed men and women by police.
They are many volunteer organisations applying themselves to local social and environmental problems including groups focusing on : appropriate technology, biodiversity, forests, corruption, cultural survival, alcoholism, pollution and urban sprawl, water ,wildlife and women’s issues. A campaign against the Tehri Dam ‘maldevelopment’ has been ongoing since it’s construction began 30 years ago. One commentator notes that despite the official propaganda about the benefits of ‘progress’,
It is important to ask, benefits for whom? Who should control and benefit from the resources of a region? Opposition to the dam over its severe environmental impact, economic merit, and adequate compensation, have largely been glossed over in the national press, although in groundbreaking studies in scientific and environmental journals, the Tehri Dam has not fared as well. RR (4.7.00)
Local knowledge (and common sense!) realises that a massive dam in an earthquake zone is not a good policy, indeed cracks have already appeared. The electricity provided by the dam will not benefit the local community who have no money to purchase electricity. In addition the dam is perceived as a religious violation of the sacred Ganges River.
Like democracies everywhere, the experiences of the Uttarakhandi people are indicative of the inadequacy of a distant, centralised government working within an economic paradigm. The village of Dulmooth, is one example where the elected officials exercise a right to mark timber trees for felling by villagers in the forest department’s reserved forest where villagers should have rights to use the forest also.
The forest is shared by at least three villages, and had become a brown patch till it came under the management of the locals about 20 years ago. Now, broad-leaved species give enough fodder and fuelwood for the villagers, and women spend a fraction of the time they spent earlier in collecting firewood. Women have also taken over the functions of the government officials — controlling grazing, felling, lopping, guarding the forest, catching violators and confiscating their axes, prosecuting and imposing fines on them and settling disputes over the forest produce.
Elected officials are anyways bound by various legal provisions that hinder, rather than facilitate, autonomous decision-making. The women are, therefore, not keen to make theirs an elected body and apply for registration. “We manage quite well without the help of forest laws or district authorities,”
The lack of co-operation from government, forces local communities to fend for themselves, and like the Mondragon experience, this can often be very successful.
Part of the success of community action in Uttakarhand lies in fact that these people work where they live and are intimately familiar both with each other and their natural environment. As such, the very structure of their living environment is contributory to community.
In most Western societies the ‘cult of individualism’ has led to isolated living and working spaces. Although this is changing to some extent in the housing industry with trends towards semi detached town houses, the poor in many Western cities are still living in the huge, ‘depersonalised’ apartment towers (Saunders 1999: 28).
Part of the reconnection with nature and community in these places has been the establishment of community parks and gardens created and maintained by citizens, not councils. Since 1989, urban permaculture gardens in Havana, Cuba have liberated the poor from food shortages brought on by international sanctions, (now city gardens are providing half of Cuba’s food supply!) and attracted community activists from all over the world to participate in a two-directional learning experience.
Not only are community gardeners providing for themselves, but sharing the product of their labours and promoting sustainable practice. Citizens have encouraged council to support them with information, seeds and free land titles on which to farm. Chemical fertilisers and pesticides have been banned. In addition, public health has improved with the availability of fresh produce, and I daresay so has mental health with the empowerment of oppressed individuals in a common and highly successful struggle. The gardens provide remedial work for young offenders who often enjoy it so much, according to one teacher, “they don’t want to leave”.
She sums up the success of public gardens:
We organised a brigade of family and friends and created it for ourselves. We needed only our hands. And we have a wonderful relationship with the people around us; we all work together and make our city a good place. We provide good, cheap food for people, and free food and care to those who need it. (Saunders 1999: 29)
World-wide many people have organised themselves into ‘intentional communities’ , buying land solely for the purpose of living democratically and sustainably.
There are hundreds of intentional communities Australia, with most of them located in NNSW and NQLD. These communities are actively attempting to improve their relationship with the bush whilst living in it. Max Lindegger, one of the founders of Crystal Waters Community in SE QLD, has helped develop a tool by which to measure community sustainability. Most importantly they include a spiritual dimension on an equal basis with ecological and social sustainability.
Ecological aspects include living in harmony with the natural environment, respecting the nonhuman world and ensuring its integrity by diminishing one’s own harmful practices and the harm of the community as a whole. A good public knowledge of ones bioregion is also a measure of the communities ability to monitor the effect their practices are having on the natural environment. It is expected that a truly sustainable community would regenerate the natural environment rather than destroy it. Thus food is organically grown, and the less products need to be made and bought outside the community the better. Reusing and improvising are seen to be both ecologically and spiritually sound (in that it takes imagination to improvise!). Creativity and cultural vitality are part of the spiritual leg, and seen as a measure of community unity, encouraging personal esteem and growth through belonging. The third leg is the social, whereby the degree to which people co-operate, share and feel safe to express themselves is a good indication of social health. Crystal Waters itself has an educational program where people form all over Australia and the world have visited to learn permaculture and the world view that accompanies it.
At Black Horse Creek community, near Kyogle in NNSW, a community building facilitates regular social events and monthly meetings are held to decide maintenance issues. Informally groups meet garden, draw, horse ride, and otherwise share skills. Each resident has a 10 hectare ‘share’ in the property on which they live and build homes largely of recycled products and have permaculture gardens, but 750 of the 1,000 hectare property is common and designated wildlife reserve. It is being actively regenerated from the former cattle property with as many as 2000 trees being planted last year under a grant from the state government. Although many of the 50 people living on the community are unemployed in the economic sense, they certainly are not in any other. Arguably the ecological impact of residents living in such communities is much less than those living and working in cities.
In Brisbane many NGOs and citizens groups have organised to provide some of the basics for life and community in public gardens like the City Farm at Windsor, Morningside, West End and many other suburbs. Organic food co-ops and buying groups have been organised in many suburbs and universities. People are becoming more environmentally aware in increasing participation in the 200 or so land care and reforestation groups in South–east Queensland, such a s ‘Creek Freaks’, RAGE, and SCRUB to name but a few.
Dryzek emphasises the importance of a truly autonomous public sphere as a precondition for an ecologically rational reconstruction of society. There are two main barriers to conditions, that would allow increased public awareness and involvement in local issues. They are educational institutions and the mass media. ‘Cross-fertilisation’ of ideas in academia is vital to changing both government educational policies and hence the world view of individuals and institutions. We live under a system that firstly, suppresses or ridicules difference; and secondly actively promotes egoistic individualism at the expense of common interests.
Suppression of difference in both educational institutions and the media can be linked to some extent with powerful economic interests involved, which can be said to “undermine any pretensions to democratic legitimacy” (Dryzek: 32). Universities are more and more reliant on corporate sponsorship in order to fund programs. As such they are obliged to produce both research and graduates that will fuel the economic machine. Personal growth is no longer a motivation for education, when increased competition in all things is encouraged. This state of affairs is both contrary to the encouragement of respect and esteem for difference necessary for co-operation and the development of community. We often take this intense competitiveness into the workplace and our private lives become increasingly alienated from others. We cannot admit intimacy, share or co-operate with others easily when we perceive they may be a threat to our getting ahead. It is easy to believe that, on the surface, democracy is alive and well when there are no violent oppositions to what we think is best for us. So long as one stays within the confines of the Australian Dream, one may never be exposed to the kind of opposition that makes for revolutions like that ongoing in Uttarakhand, and those people that do protest will always been perceived as misguided at best, idiots at worst. Privilege is invisible to those that have it.
Here we are espousing community and environmental justice for humans and non-humans and right above us, in the is same building ,other students are learning about the ‘economic man’ and the ‘invisible hand’ and those values will become, for a great number of them, internalised as part of their own beliefs. It is this perception that convinces me of the dire need for philosophy in schools, and in the public sphere. One of the vital skills each person needs to resist an oppressive system is the ability not only to question policies that damage their own lives, but to understand the bigger picture and empathise with others unlike them. The ability to question reality as science and the educational system present it to us is absolutely vital to social change. With understanding comes empathy and with empathy comes caring.
As things change at a grass roots level under the impetus of people acting where they are ‘at’, (as Jim Dodge might say) there is also need to change the political structure that is preventing people from arraigning their own lives. Real possibilities for change exist, according to Dryzek, in those places in the ‘political economy’ where there is significant opposition and contradiction. The world-wide anti-corporate globalisation movement is a response to such conditions: corporate globalisation is widely opposed because it is held responsible for preventing people acting for themselves in a truly public sphere and because it does not distribute the benefits of economic growth evenly, despite claims to the contrary by its advocates.
The very negativity with which institutions react to dissent (I think of the unnecessarily large police presence at the recent M1 protests for instance) and the way mass media portray any threat to the ideology of the free market is indication that they consider it a serious threat.
Though protest may be defined by many commentators as the last resort of the powerless, it has two valuable products: it unites peoples with similar objections in solidarity and it allows the movements to use the mass media to some extent to get there message across. When video footage shows a police officer battening a protestor, then proclaims it was ‘protestor violence’, and news reports do this repeatedly, it is hard for any sensible person to accept that an anti-corporate protest of 700 people where 45 people get arrested has no legitimacy. Where protesters are objecting to the behaviour of the corporations that own the media that is portraying them as violent, it is only a matter of time before people begin to suspect.
In addition all protest movements are increasingly using and creating their own media tools to get their message across. Street theatre, zines, posters and leaflets have always been the tools of underground movements. In Africa and other places where literacy might be low, music continues to be a tool of protest.
Community radio stations, self-organised public meetings, student organisations, environmental and social justice groups are organising in towns all over the globe to take up the tasks governments cannot or will not do. And they are not only doing it locally. The internet has provided a unique opportunity for grass roots organisations world-wide to network and share skills and information. Global Grassroots Resistance Directory are one such network which connects thousands of organisations in 30 countries. Indymedia.org is a global organisation that allow anyone anywhere to contribute to their debunking of the news as the mass media portray it. Anyone with a computer can contribute articles or pictures and comment on others. Although the vast majority of the world’s people do not have access to advanced technology, (indeed many people do not even have access to safe drinking water!), the existence of global resistance allows the affluent first world to wake up from its complacency and help others.
What crisis? – institutionalised denial
Exposure to the kind of information that protestors are trying to expose can be the catalyst to change a persons world view. It is a political act to suppress such information, or devalue it in the public sphere and that is exactly what happened to Donella Meadows etal, with the ‘Limits to Growth’ simulations, (and which has been attempted with less success in the global warming issue). It wasn’t long before their scientific credibility was shredded by the establishment and the scientific expertise that depends upon and supports ideologically to a large extent, the economic ideology which is the value base from which our society operates.
I contend that these things happen because governments KNOW the subversive effects such knowledge can have if it is given credence in the scientific and public sphere. Chris Brazier in 1999 wrote an article called “The Radical Twentieth Century” in which he outlines the way that “Truth, Justice and the American Way” (as defined by the US govt) has usurped the meaning behind every freedom struggle every positive movement and every so called negative or ‘terrorist’ act and renamed them to suit the American economic rationalist paradigm. Time magazine has relabelled history to suit the American constitutional principles while largely ignoring world-wide trends towards self-management of communities, increasing awareness of social injustices perpetrated by the economic system, and anger and despair at ecological disasters, accompanied by much unpublicised rejection of the primacy of economics and false democracy. Time magazine waxes lyrical saying: “Democracy can exist without capitalism, and capitalism without democracy, but probably not for very long. Political and economic freedom tend to go together…” (1999:8)
This is a half-truth often espoused by advocates of the free market. Pure capitalism, like pure liberalism or pure autonomy for the individual, is NOT compatible with democracy. For the supremacy of one value or one individuals’ wants over others is contrary to the good of the whole community: indeed they may even be mutually exclusive (Stewart 2000:3). As commentator Michael Sandel suggests, the notion of autonomy as espoused by liberalism is “parasitic on a notion of community”. In order for a free an autonomous individual to exist, there needs to be a community that supports open debate of ideas, which provides the psychological basis for free thought (ie. Is not oppressive). Insofar as the media, governments and corporations control social debate, we do not live in a free society. Until people questioning the status quo can speak and be heard without misrepresentation, neither free speech nor democracy can be said to truly exist.
In summary:
People are already actively arraigning their own lives without the help of politicians and outside mainstream economics in ways that respect each other and the planet also.
The broadest meaning of sustainability is applicable in this grass-roots context, for collective practises that respect the differences of individuals certainly are socially sustainable.
Where they also promote ecological care they are environmentally sustainable. The fundamental difference between sustainability in a grass roots context as opposed to what corporations generally mean when they talk about sustainability, is that the former is not premised on economic growth.
We can’t expect that the political will to change the world to protect the environment will materialise any time soon. Recent politics in the US is a pretty good indication of just how little the environment means to those so easily swayed by economics and the power it affords them and their pals. And we sure as hell can’t expect Captain Planet to save us!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AtKisson, A 1999 Believing Cassandra: an optimist looks at a pessimists world, Scribe Publications, Carlton North: Australia
Biehl, J 2000 “The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism” at Institute for Social Ecology www.tao.ca/~ise/library/biehl/b_polchpt1html visited October 2000
Brazier, C 1999 “The Radical Twentieth Century” in New Internationalist, No. 309, Jan/Feb pp7-9
Callicott, JB 2001 The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse, unpublished (by permission of the author)
Clark, John 1998 “A Social Ecology” in Zimmerman, M (ed) Environmental Philosophy: from animal rights to radical ecology, Prentice Hall, New Jersey: US
Eckersley, R 1999 “Ecocentrism explained and defended” in Dryzek and Schlosberg (eds) Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader, Oxford University Press: US
Fox, W 1990 Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, Shambala Press
Fox, W 1998 “The Deep Ecology Debate and Its Parallels” in Zimmerman, M (ed) Environmental Philosophy: from animal rights to radical ecology, Prentice Hall, New Jersey: US
Gilligan, C 1987 “Moral Orientation and Moral Development”, in Feder, E and Meyers, D (eds) Woman and Moral Theory, Rowman & Littlefield: NJ
Gottleib, R (ed) 1997 The Ecological Community: Environmental Challenges for Philosophy, Politics and Morality, Routledge, London: Great Britain
Kapoor, A 2000 “Green at the Grassroots: Hill women succeed where government fails” at http://www.humanscapeindia.org/hs0200/hs20013t.htm visited April 2001
Lindegger, M et al “Community Sustainability Assessment” at http://www.gaia.org/secretariats/international/projects/csrareviewgroup/scoring.html visited April 2001
Manes, C 1998 “Ecotage” in ” in Zimmerman, M (ed) Environmental Philosophy: from animal rights to radical ecology, Prentice Hall, New Jersey: US
Mc Guiness, J 1999 “Updating Wilderness in Australia”, in Wilderness Society News, March
Meadows, D.H. & Meadows, D.L., et al 1972 “The Limits to Growth”, New American Library
Moyer, B 1999 “Four Roles of Social Movements” leaflet
Nash, R 1989 The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics, Wisconsin University Press, Madison: US
Sandel, M 1992 ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’, in de-Shalit et al (ed) Communitarianism and Individualism, Oxford University Press
Saunders, J 1999 ”Seizing the Reins. Urban Gardeners” in New Internationalist, June 1999
Stewart, K 2000 “Green Utopias - Social Ecology and Ecofeminism: visions of a just and sustainable world”, unpublished
Srivastava, Dr S K 1997 Report on Women and Panchayati Raj (Rural Self Governance) “ at http://education.vsnl.com/phalguni/wpr.html visited April 2001
“The Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa” at http://iisd1.iisd.ca/50comm/commdb/desc/d13.htm visited April 2001
“The Tehri Dam: Development or Maldevelopment?” at http://www.geocities.com/RainForest/Vines/7039/index-sm.html visited April 2001
Tolstoy, L 1900 “Arranging Our Own Lives” in The Anarchist Reader
The need for an ethic regarding our treatment of animals grows with our ever increasing use of them for food, clothing, labour, medicine, research and education. This usage is becoming more mechanised and removed from our daily lives so that we may remain unaware of how inhumane it has become despite it’s importance to the human economy. This removal from daily experience has meant that cruel practices often go uncriticised in public debate. However, philosophers have been discussing the nature of our obligations to non-human animals since ancient times.
Recent moral theories that have elaborated on how we ought to treat animals have largely moved along two axes The first rely on utilitarian claims that we should minimise suffering and maximise happiness of animals because they have the capacity to feel; the second on deontological claims that because animals have ‘ends’, they too have inalienable rights that we should not transgress. Both these streams of thought are part of the ‘first extension’ of moral theories that deal with the equality of human beings, by extending that reasoning to other species.
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is the ethic that judges the rightness or wrongness of an action by it’s consequences for utility. Utility, according to Jeremy Bentham is based on “the greatest happiness principle”, in that actions are right in proportion to their promotion of happiness. Bentham saw the significance of this theory for our behaviour towards animals in that causing the suffering of animals was wrong because it was our moral obligation to promote happiness. Sentience, the ability to feel pleasure or suffer, is the defining criteria that warrants moral obligation. It is supposed that sentience entails having interests, and thus as our duty to maximise happiness, we must takes its interests into consideration.
This method of deciding moral issues was meant to alleviate all the problems associated with a rigid set of universalisable rules such as Kant espoused, that may sometimes lead to bad consequences. For instance, a ‘thou shalt not kill’ rule may prevent one from alleviating the suffering of a being when there is no prospect of recovery. Utilitarianism is thus thought incompatible with a rule-oriented Kantian ethic because it does not espouse absolute moral principles, actions being determined by circumstances. However, Kant proposed that we should treat the ends of others as we would treat our own, which is perfectly compatible with the utilitarian claim that “everyone counts for one and none for more than one” (Hare paraphrasing Bentham: 235)
Peter Singer, in All Animals are Equal (1974) argued that the basic principle of equality that we already apply in our dealings with other human beings can validly be extended to include other sentient beings. Singer, like Bentham, compares the liberation of animals from the “tyranny” of human usage to other liberation movements including the emancipation of slaves, and equal rights for women, both of which were initially considered unthinkable. we
Singer puts a lucid case against the traditional excuses we have used to exclude animals from the realm of consideration. He marks the fact that differences in our ability to reason, to use language, to form intentions based on learning are morally irrelevant, because such criteria may not be possessed by all humans, and indeed may be possessed by some animals even to a greater degree that some humans. Singer postulates a gradation of awareness amongst sentient beings that puts some humans on par with some animals. For instance, the intellectual capacity of a dog is evidently more advanced than the new-born human infant. If it is the case that “possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human being to use another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit non-humans” (Singer 1974: 32) Thus both Singer and Bentham see no clear cut line between humans and animals.
The greatest strength of Singer’s utilitarianism is it’s justification of equality. Singer makes it clear that we cannot continue to embrace any notion of equality with consistency if we are not willing extend equality to animals.
we can only be logically consistent if we accept animals into the realm of consideration, or else reject the notion of equality for humans also.
Deontological or rights theory
In utilitarianism, no being has a ‘right’ to preferential treatment over any other, it is their interests that is paramount. Deontology is that moral framework that takes values to be independent of outcomes. As such, it is the values themselves that determine right behaviour, not consequences.
Kant’s theory of ethics espoused the intrinsic worth of human beings as ‘ends-in-themselves’ based on our ability to reason. Kant supposes that the ability to reason allows us to conceptualise our ‘ends’, and this somehow separates us from beings who are unable to conceptualise their ends, though he grants they may have them. While it is the relevance of reason to moral worth that Singer takes to task, it is Kant’s notion of inherent worth based on ends that animal rights theorist Tom Regan adopts in his Case for Animal Rights.
Even if humans were justified in claiming our superiority to animals in every respect, would that give us the right to use other species as we will? Tom Regan thinks not. If anything, our superiority as the possessors of language, consciousness or souls should rather increase our duty towards them.
Suppose it is true that all the other species utilize species “below” them…from this fact it does not follow that we humans ought to utilize the species below us, or that we do nothing wrong if we do so. Neither values not moral principles follow logically from facts…(Regan 1994:25)Regan’s position is for the abolition of all animal usage by human beings. His view is that, since all living beings have ends, they are ‘ends-in-themselves’ and as such have inalienable rights to life and liberty. He espouses the notion of the ‘inherent value’ of all sentient life. Regan shows that we already accept such a notion for human beings, and that there is no valid reason for not extending that to animals. Indeed, Regan’s extension of moral consideration to animals argues against the very same claims to difference that Singer’s does.
Regan sees the wrong in human use of animals not in the fact that we cause them to suffer, but that we think we have the right to do so, to “view animals as our resources”, as means to our ends (Regan 1985:13).
It is not just a refinement or reduction that is called for, not just larger, cleaner cages, not just more generous use of anesthetic or the elimination of multiple surgery, not just tidying up the system. It is complete replacement. The best we can do when using animals is not to use them. (Regan 1994: 24)Regan establishes the rights case by systematically excluding the claims of theorists who deny that animal deserve moral consideration, just has Singer has done.
Bernard Rollin agrees that if we are willing to attribute inherent value to human beings, regardless of their personal characteristics, then we must logically extend that to animals. Inherent value arises, for Rollin, out of the biological natures of living beings: He attributes to them a ‘telos’, “the infringement upon which matters greatly to them, and the fulfilment of which is central to their lives.” (1994:30)
One of the benefits of a deontological approach to animal ethics is that it stems from a fixed principle. Thus Regan can afford to be abolisionist in his stance towards animal usage, because from the notion of intrinsic worth it follows that no transgression of a beings right to respect will be brooked.
Critique
When we are making judgements about what is right or wrong treatment of others, human or animal, within a utilitarian framework, it is the consequences of our actions for the interests of those individuals that we should take into account. This is what Singer calls the “principle of consideration of interests” This principle does not entirely discount human usage of animals, where it is judged that the benefit to humans outweighs the harm to any individual animal, and thus can be used to justify animal use in medical research. The supremacy of the greater good over the suffering of the individual is a common criticism of utilitarianism.
Peter Carruthers writes that this flaw is ‘counter-intuitive to…questions of distributive justice” (1992:27)
Since all that utilitarianisn regards as mattering, in the end, is total…utility, the intense sufferings of a few can in principle be justified in terms of the marginal benefits of many (1992:27)Another criticism of utilitarianism put forward by Carruthers and others, is that making moral judgements based on the outcomes seems to place an enormous burden on the individual to always be making conscious choices regarding everything. The difficulty of predicting outcomes becomes immediately obvious. Quite often animal based research that has shown promise in the theoretical stage, has not given the great result it was hoped, so lives may have been expended unnecessarily.
Bernard Williams says he ‘suspects’ that utilitarianism makes the notion of human integrity meaningless. Personal preferences are supposed to be overlooked in favour of utility. Williams understand good actions as requiring a personal commitment to certain values that acting out of utility seems to deny the need for. He suggests that utilitarians might overlook the importance of personal commitments to personal happiness, when they put utility towards general happiness in advance of personal projects, and that personal happiness is possibly as important to acting well towards others as is the happiness of others.
The Deontologial approach to ethics using the notion of intrinsic worth has been criticised by Singer for its vagueness. Singer considers appeals to intrinsic worth to be detrimental to the consideration of the rights of animals because he sees it needs an appeal to some common characteristic. Singer seems to imply a ‘slippery slope’ of commitment to a separation of moral worth based on characteristics that threatens to undermine consequentialist morality. However, Regan denies the relevance of personal characteristics in deciding moral worth, the intrinsic value of individuals coming from beyond personal talents. He identifies that value in the fact that we are all the “experiencing subjects of a life”(Regan 1994: 23)
Despite the fact that rights theory and utilitarian theory have different means of encompassing animals in the realm of moral consideration, they do manage to agree that is their end. Essentially, the similarities between animals and humans, in particular sentience, are the grounds by which this equality of consideration is based. However, for Regan it is the fact that we are all “the experiencing subjects of a life” that make us equal; while for Singer we are equal by virtue of our having interests (especially that of avoiding pain). What they do wholly agree on is that the first extension of moral consideration to animals is the logical progression of other liberation movements, and that by espousing such a view one is committed to act on it. As Regan says, “philosophy is no substitute for action” (Regan 1994:24)
Bibliography
Carruthers, P 1992 The Animal Issue, Cambridge University Press, NY: USA
Hare, RM 1999 “Why I am only a demi-vegetarian” in Jamieson, D (ed) Singer and his Critics, Basil Blackwell: UK
Kant, I 1994 “We have only indirect duties to animals”, in Environmental Ethics, Pojman, L (ed), Jones, Bartlett and Sons: USA
Regan, T 1985 “The case for animal rights” in In Defence of Animals, Singer, P (ed) Basil Blackwell: UK
Rollin, B 1994 “Sentience is the criterion for moral worth” in Environmental Ethics, Pojmnan, L (ed), Jones, Bartlett and Sons
Singer, P 1998 “All animals are equal” in Environmental Philosophy: from animal rights to radical ecology, Zimmerman, M (ed) Prentice Hall
Singer, P 1976 Animal Liberation, Englewood Cliffs: NJ
Williams, B “Two examples” in Utilitarianism: For and Against
Women must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships is one of domination - Rosemary Radford Reuther
It is no coincidence that social justice movements like animal rights and human rights should find many parallels to reaffirm their claims of validity. There is also a case for a unique relationship between feminist and ecological values: not only do the goals of the environmental movement have much in common with the feminist struggle to free womyn from the domination of a patriarchal system that also subjugates nature, but that the domination of nature is akin to the domination of persons. Linking these two struggles can be mutually reinforcing.
Ecofeminism is difficult to define because it is so diverse. However, ecofeminist thought does have a common thread: that there are important correlations between the domination of women and the domination of nature and the implications are “crucial to feminism, environmentalism and environmental philosophy”1.
Karen Warren identifies eight important womyn-nature connections. The first is a historical link, whereby patterns of domination have stemmed from the end of the matriarchal period in Europe marked by invasion from the east. Ancient Greek culture is also held as historically responsible in establishing the dualist and rationalist traditions that continue today. These historical links have been continually reinforced throughout history, but most notably by the establishment of a mechanised view of nature as promoted by Descartes in the 16th century.
The second womyn-nature connection identified by ecofeminists is conceptual. Val Plumwood points to the value dualisms and hierarchies within our language and thought which pair values such as ‘man/womyn’, ‘reason/emotion’, ‘mind/body’, ‘culture/nature’ where the first are identified as the norm or superior, the second as aberrations or otherness.2 Accordingly women in giving birth and mothering are equated with nature and the body, men extract themselves from nature by engaging in “rational” projects. Feminists maintain that though birth might be a natural occurrence, the circumstances in which it occurs is social, as too is child-rearing. Ynestra King: “the process of nurturing an unsocialised, undifferentiated human infant into an adult person is the bridge between nature and culture”4. Some theorists have seen the gendered differences in our lives to have given women a unique way of seeing the world, a “different consciousness” that increases their respect for nature.
The third womyn-nature connection used by ecofeminists includes finding empirical evidence for their claims. Health risks to women, first world development policies, animal exploitation in factory farms and the practice of meat-eating, pornography and rape, are some of the diverse range of cultural phenomena identified as evidence of patriarchal domination. Some more radical theorists see womyns identification with nature as complying with that which oppresses, yet some womyn have chosen the spiritual dimension of identification with nature with its recognition of the value of indigenous beliefs that have often been decimated in the dominator culture.
Symbolic connections found in religion, art and language are the fourth sphere of womyn-nature connections. These social structures perpetrate many symbolic devaluation of the feminine, including the identification of the body as impossibly non-spiritual, or the only source of value for women (especially in art). Language reinforces the link between women and nature by using the same exploitative phrases to describe both: “nature is raped, her secrets are penetrated”.
Epistemology is charged with being male-biased and the source of the fifth womyn-nature connection analysed by ecofeminists. Philosophy has been implicated in maintaining the separation between humans and nature, and in perpetuating the view that nature is purely instrumental. Ecofeminist analysis will require us to re-examine many philosophical notions that we take for granted. Reason, rationality, knowledge, objectivity, ethics and what constitutes the moral self will need a radical rethink. Marti Kheel sees an affinity with deep ecology here, where “the emphasis of both philosophies is not on an abstract or ‘rational’ calculation of value but rather on the development of a new consciousness for all of life, they call for an inward transformation in order to attain outward change”3
The political connections between womyn and nature are far ranging: from health, to the treatment of animals, to the peace and anti-nuclear movements. Womyn are clearly an important voice in these movements and, in my experience, are often there in greater numbers than men.
The seventh womyn-nature connection dealt with by ecofeminst analysis is an ethical one. Theorists point out that environmental ethics as formulated in the mainstream are “problematically anthropocentric or hopelessly andocentric”. Ecofeminists suggest alternatives ethical theories, including an ‘ethic of care’ stemming from the notion of care we learn to give and receive as part of the parent-child relationship, reciprocity, kinship, animal rights, and social ecology perspectives.
The final womyn-nature connection is a theoretical one. Ecofeminist theory is seen as a valid alternative to the consequentialist / deontological dichotomy: an ethic not based either on weighing outcomes to achieve the “greatest happiness”, or setting inflexible rules. They make no claims to be the only alternative, but have some common threads with deep ecology, social ecology and Leopoldian land ethics.
The significance of ecofeminism lies within and without environmental ethics. Like much feminist critique before it, ecofeminism points to a new way of formulating mainstream thought. Importantly: “Can mainstream philosophy generate an environmental ethic that is not male-biased?” Many ecofeminist theorists suggest that it cannot because it is deeply entrenched in the dominator model of patriarchal culture. If it cannot, then it remains the task of alternatives like ecofeminism to dissect the fundamental premises of mainstream philosophical analysis and theory, and to show how it might be different.
Unless you have been living in a closet for the last 20 years, it can hardly have escaped your notice that many people perceive the world to be in environmental crisis. In Australia alone we have vast tracts of farmland rendered useless and dead through salinisation; we have agricultural runoff, trawling and climate change destroying the Great Barrier Reef; we have less than 5% of old growth forests remaining. We have a kangaroo cull quota of over five million while introduced hoofed animals that outnumber the human population 10 to one are pulverising our marginal ecosystems beyond repair. In Queensland we have the highest rate of land clearing in the western world, the fifth highest in the world if we were a country. Globally, climate change has resulted in the hottest 14 years on record since 1980; yet we continue to use fossil fuels (indeed our use of them increases yearly) despite the knowledge that the carbon rich pollution that results is a major contributor to this climate change.
Globally, biodiversity is decreasing at an alarming rate:
70% of the world’s fish species are either fully or over-exploited. One third of all fish species are threatened with extinction.
14% of the world’s 242,000 plant species are threatened with extinction.
11% of the world’s 9,600 species of birds are threatened with extinction
11% of the world’s 4,400 mammal species are threatened with extinction
This decline in species can inevitably be traced to over exploitation or negligent use of habitat by human beings.
In the face of these sobering facts, it is difficult to see what difference philosophy can make. However, ethical theories can help make clear our concerns by attempting to show that what we feel is right or good is also logically valid. That our feelings of moral outrage are justified.
A study carried out by the Wilderness Society in 1996 found that most Australians do value wilderness, only 12% thought economic growth was of greater importance. The study found that:
there was strong and widespread agreement…(that) ‘wilderness areas should be conserved for their own sake, not because people want to use them’ and ‘ we have a duty to future generations to conserve wilderness areas (1999:2)There are obviously deep contradictions in our society when most people value nature, yet are acting within a system that is detrimental to it.
Roderick Nash elucidates the two views that promote human obligations to preserve nature:
first, some people believe that it is right to protect and wrong to abuse nature…from the standpoint of human interest…But the more radical meaning…is that nature has intrinsic value and consequently possesses at least the right to exist. (1989:9)The first view is what has been called anthropocentrism, or human-centred ethics; the latter covers biocentrism and deep ecology. Nash sees this more radical way of viewing nature as part of the evolution of ethics. He observes that “environmental ethics is revolutionary; it is arguably the most dramatic expansion of morality in the course of human thought” (1989:7) He also observes that the idea, to most people, is still ‘incredible’. However, so too was the idea of freeing slaves, women’s equal rights and the rights of indigenous peoples. Every milestone in the evolution of ethics, in the words of John Stuart Mill, has been met with ‘ridicule, discussion, (and finally) adoption’ (in Nash 1989:8) Paul Taylor also sees the acceptance of ‘life-centred’ rather than ‘human centred’ ethics as having the potential for a “profound reordering of our moral universe” (1998:72)
Before I go on to discuss the more radical premises of environmental ethics, I would like to say a little about the enterprise of ethics in general. The main purpose of ethics, as I see it, is to make clear to us the reasons for what we do. When it comes to other human beings, this is a relatively easy task. We assume that other people are very like ourselves - we accept that they feel pain and pleasure and have the same basic needs as we do. We are able to put ourselves in the place of another because we know what it feels like to be a human being. It is on this premise that we rest our obligation to treat others well, hence we have the ‘golden rule’ that we should ‘do unto others as we would have them do to us’. Thus we value human life. We can call this value an intrinsic one because it is not merit-based, it rests on no personal quality or talent, just the virtue of being human. So even human beings that are medically brain dead are still accorded some moral consideration even if that consideration involves turning off their life support to preserve their dignity as persons.
Peter Singer has shown us that it is not difficult to extend the realm of moral consideration to other sentient, or feeling, beings because we can empathise with them. We can imagine what it feels like to be a rabbit whose eyes are being washed with a caustic substance, what it feels like to be a monkey deprived of its young and incarcerated in a small cage for the duration of its life. Singer accords value to the lives of animals because:
This last point is what rights thrusts have called a point-of-view that amounts to a purpose or and end to their lives.
However, Singer voices some doubt about the usefulness of speaking of life having ‘intrinsic value’. In his essay All Animals Are Equal 1974, he suggests that intrinsic value “takes the problem back one step, because any satisfactory defence of the claim…would need to refer to some relevant capacities or characteristics that all and only humans possess.” Given that there is no such characteristic, to use intrinsic value to substantiate a claim necessitates including all of life, including non-sentient life, which Singer is loath to do. However, nineteen years later, in the 1993 edition of Practical Ethics, Singer does accord animals intrinsic value, but sees any further extension of the concept as ‘problematic’. Hence Singer’s view of environmental ethics is restricted to the instrumental: preserving the environment protects the interests of sentient beings.
Singer draws the line of moral consideration at animals, while plants, trees, rocks, rivers and mountains remain only as useful to sentient life. There is room in this theory to accommodate caring for the environment, despite the fact that we cannot know what it is like to be a tree or a river. Singer encourages assessment of our idea of luxury, and a measure of pleasure based not on consumption, but on developing human relationships.
Others seek to justify our obligation to preserve the environment beyond the needs of sentient life. When deep ecology speaks of nature having ‘intrinsic value’ they seek to find value in nature that is not attached to the needs of life forms. Paul Taylor claims that judgements based on merit are a human cultural phenomenon, a form given to nature based on our value system. Inherent worth or intrinsic value judgements, on the other hand, have no grounding in culture. If a thing has inherent worth, it simply does, you believe it or you don’t, but no evidence can be brought forward to defend the claim. The ‘good’ or ‘end’ of an organism life exists independently of our valuing it.
it is the good (well-being, welfare) of individual organisms considered as entities having inherent worth, that determines our moral relations with the Earth’s wild communities of life. (Taylor 1998:73)Taylor’s life-centred ethics seeks to expand the realm of moral consideration to include all life, using the notion of the inherent worth of life as it’s justification. Being alive, he says, involves having a ‘good of one’s own’. That good is the “full development of (one’s) biological powers”, through the realisation of the life cycle. There is no need for a life form to have awareness of this end for it to exist.
I take it that trees, for example, have no knowledge or desires of feelings. Yet it is undoubtedly the case that trees can be harmed or benefited by our actions… we can help or hinder them in the realization of their goodTaylor’s theory overlaps with deep ecology when he speaks of the interconnectedness of life being vital to the realization of individual good. Holmes Rolston III accords individual life value because of this interconnectedness. For Rolston, individuals have ends-in-themselves which cause them to value their own lives intrinsically, but individuals also serve the system that supports them. The ecosystem and the biosphere as a whole is credited with a higher respect because not only is it instrumental to the lives of individuals, it is the source of new species, or kinds. Individuals and species increase their kind, but the biosphere increases kinds. The biosphere is a creative force. Inanimate life and non-life are all valued intrinsically in this theory. It is ’short sighted’, he says,
to say that the only value in the system is the production of life…the astronomical and geological processes are precursors to life, but that does not reduce them to mere instrumental value. Nature is not inert and passive until acted upon…by life and mind. Neither sentience nor consciousness are necessary for inventive processes to occur (1988:198)It is the creative potential, or ‘inventive processes’ of the biosphere that Rolston identifies as the “root of all value” (1988:198)
It is difficult to comprehend how something so apparently inert and insensitive to what happens to it, like dirt for instance, could have intrinsic value. Dirt doesn’t have interests in the Singerian sense: it can’t suffer. Dirt doesn’t have a goal, an end that wants realising that would give it value in Taylor’s theory. It appears to be the mere by-product of natural processes a resource for life.
Dirt can be accorded value in Taylor’s system if one accepts that “commitment to certain normative principles” (to a moral code) need not involve validation by empirical truth or facts. Taylor gives up claims to comprehensive reason for confirming beliefs. This is not without precedent because, as CS Pierce points out, human beings often use a combination of experience and reason to fix their beliefs. Additionally, comprehensive reason has been used to justify some heinous crimes and makes egoism seem entirely plausible. But egoism does not offer protection for animals or nature, or even for other human beings except as they are resources for the pleasure of the egoist.
Respect for Nature, then, is an attitude informed by beliefs, based on experience and intuition. This is the tack that some ecofeminist philosophers take when they identify feelings, compassion and caring as the source of morality. Indeed, when one thinks about the right or wrongness of despoiling wilderness, it is a feeling that something good will be lost by doing so that first arises. John Rodman describes this sensation when he says:
I confess that I need only stand in the midst of a clear-cut forest, a strip-mined hillside, a defoliated jungle, or a dammed canyon to feel uneasy with the assumption that could yield the conclusion that no human action can make a difference to the welfare of anything but sentient animals…An appreciation and respect for nature arises, for Rodman, as a sensibility developed through experiencing the facts of nature and reflecting on the feelings that arise form those experiences.
Rodman is in good company when he refers to the feelings of awe inspired by nature. Paul Davies, astrophysicist and physics populariser sees microphysics, astronomy and chemistry as “fine tuned to such a stunning degree (that) a hidden principle seems to be at work, organising the cosmos in a coherent way.” Mike Corwin, another astrophysicist wonders:
our very existence appears to be the merest happenstance. Any significant change